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"The goal of widespread participation
in all values throughout the social process

is the fundamental criterion of policy."
S. McDougal/Harold D. Lasswell'

-Myres

INTRODUCTION

Three years ago, the Chemical Weapons Convention2 (CWC) entered
into force. The treaty, as it has been rightly observed,3 represents the
most complex disarmament and nonproliferation treaty in history, not
least because of the multitude of national implementation measures it
requires.
Although the developments achieved under the new treaty framework may be generally satisfactory, 4 considerable difficulties persist in
the realm of national implementation. A great number of states parties
linger behind in enacting national legislation that is suitable to guarantee
effective compliance with the CWC obligations.
As the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) in The Hague observed in November 1998, only 26 out of the
1.

MYRES S. McDOUGAL

& HAROLD D.

LASSWELL, THE IDENTIFICATION AND AP-

(1959), reprintedin INTERNATIONAL LAW
15, 41 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, 1981).
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons, January 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter CWC].
3. See Charles Flowerree, National Implementation Measures, in THE CHEMICAL
PRAISAL OF DIVERSE SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC ORDER
ESSAYS

WEAPONS CONVENTION-IMPLEMENTATION

ISSUES

32, 32 (Brad Roberts ed., Center for

Strategic and International Studies Significant Issues Series Vol. XIV No. 13, 1992).
4. For a comprehensive overview of achievements under the CWC, see, for example
The CWC at the Two-Year Mark, An interview with Dr. John Gee, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,
Apr.-May 1999, at 3 (1999). The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
[hereinafter OPCW] is the body that has been established to oversee the implementation of the
CWC. Dr. Gee is the Deputy Director-General of the OPCW.
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then-i 19 states parties had by that time enacted national legislation
comprehensive enough to implement the CWC correctly.! Only 18 states
parties had adopted
extraterritorial penal legislation as required under
6
Article VII. 1(c).
Over the course of the past few months, this unsatisfactory situation
has not improved significantly. In particular, the implementation of the
CWC's various transfer rules continues to cause difficulties.7 In spite of
efforts in The Hague to achieve greater compliance and harmonization,8
observers continue to conclude that "there are serious problems with the
practical implementation of the Convention regarding transfers."9
In light of these problems, the chief goal of this article is to clarify
the export control obligations deriving from the CWC. Their clarification is essential for chemical nonproliferation in general and for the
successful implementation of the CWC in particular. Only on the basis
of clearly defined international obligations can the highest level of harmonization in the realm of national export controls be achieved. In turn,
only on the basis of the highest level of harmonization in matters of national export controls can chemical nonproliferation be attained most
effectively.
Clarification shall be accomplished by addressing some of the most
pressing questions in the realm of CWC export control obligations.
Among the particular issues that have remained largely unanswered are
the following:1"

5.

Report of the Director-General,3rd session of the Conference of the States Parties to

the CWC (16-20 November 1998), reprinted in 42 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTIONS BULL. 14 (1998)(review of Director-General's report by staff writer). Daniel
Feakes, Developments in the Organizationfor the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 42
CHEM. & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTIONS BULL. 14 (1998)(discussing events at the 3rd
session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC).
6. Id. See also infra Part V.A.1 (explaining CWC art. VII.l(c)).
7. For more information concerning the transfer rules of the CWC, see infra pp. 22-34.
8. For instance, at its 4th session, the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC
developed a procedural framework for the adoption of provisions regarding scheduled chemicals in low concentrations. Accordingly, the Executive Council is requested to prepare
recommendations on (a) the applicable concentration limits for declarations under Parts VII
and VI of the VA, and (b) on the application of paras. 31 and 32 of Part VII, and para. 26 of
Part VIII VA with respect to mixtures containing Schedule 2 or Schedule 3 chemicals. See
OPCW Doc. C-IV/DEC.16 (July 1, 1999) <http://www.opcw.org>.
9. Daniel Feakes, Progressin the Hague: Quarterly Review No. 23, 41 CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTIONS BULL. 6, 10 (1998).
10. Scholarly literature dealing with the question of export controls under the CWC is
rare and not very detailed. See, e.g., Ian Anthony & Jean Pascal Zanders, MultilateralSecurity-Related Export Controls, in SIPRI YEARBOOK 373, 373-80 (SIPRI ed., 1998); Michael
Bothe, National Implementation of the CWC, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION-IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 543 (M. Bothe et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Bothe
1998]; Flowerree, supra note 3; WALTER KRUTZSCH & RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY ON
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*

To what extent does the CWC require the establishment of
national export controls?

*

What exactly is the material scope of the CWC, and how
does it relate to export controls? More particularly, is a state
party obliged to control the export of unscheduled chemicals, dual-use technology or machinery with possible
chemical weapon applications? What about herbicides?
Does their export need to be regulated?
Is a state party required to establish a catch-all clause?

*
"

Should a state party extend the extraterritorial application of
its penal law to chemical weapon activities undertaken
abroad by the branch of a national company even though
that branch is incorporated under foreign law?

*

Does the CWC set minimum and maximum limits to the establishment of national export controls?

*

Do national disparities in the development of domestic
chemical industries have an influence on the export control
regime to be established?

In addressing these questions, this article serves a second purpose.
With the Australia Group (AG), there currently exists a second, older
regime in the realm of chemical nonproliferation. The AG is a legally
non-binding arrangement between a limited number of mainly Western
countries. Contrary to the CWC, it pursues nonproliferation purposes on
(1994); Thilo Marauhn, National Regulations on
Export Controls and the Chemical Weapons Convention, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION-IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 487 (M. Bothe et al. eds., 1998); Djamchid
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Momtaz, Le Rigime de Transfert des Substances Chimiques dans la Convention sur
l'Interdiction des Armes Chimiques, in THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION AND ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: A BREAKTHROUGH IN MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT 409,
409-18 (Daniel Bardonnet ed., 1995); Julian Perry Robinson, Chemical and Biological

Weapons Proliferation and Control,

PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROLS

29 (Elizabeth

Clegg et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Perry Robinson (1995)]; Julian Perry Robinson, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, 72 INT'L AFF. 73 (1996) [hereinafter Perry
Robinson (1996)]; THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, SIGNIFICANT
ISSUES
SERIES
VOL. XIV,
No. 13, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTIONIMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

(Brad Roberts ed., 1992); Natalino Ronzitti, La convention sur

l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication, du stockage et de l'emploi des armes
chimiques et sur leur destruction, 4 REVUE GgNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

881 (1995); AMY E.

SMITHSON, SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION: THE AUSTRALIA GROUP
AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, (Henry L. Stimson Ctr., Occasional Paper No.

34, 1997); Thomas Stock & Anna De Geer, Chemical trade control and Article XI of the CWC,
(last modified Sept. 16, 1997) <http://www.sipri.se/cbw/research/ssf-cwc-paper4.htl>; Rex J.
Zedalis, New Export Controls for Chemicals on the Horizon?, 30 INT'L LAW. 141 (1996).
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the basis of selectivity rather than universality. Over the past decade, the
developing countries have therefore repeatedly required the abolishment
of the AG, viewing it "as a Northern instrument of coercive trade policy,
even of underdevelopment."" The AG member states, however, have
traditionally rejected such claims, arguing that in the absence of a valid
multilateral alternative, the AG represents an indispensable nonproliferation mechanism.
With the entry into force of the CWC, such a multilateral alternative

now exists. The CWC stipulates-implicitly, if not explicitly-that the
AG be dismantled." The following evaluation of the precise contents of
the CWC export control obligations shall thus help to assess whether the
CWC represents an adequate legal framework to supplant the AG in the
realm of chemical nonproliferation, thereby allowing for progress toward greater multilateralism.
The article is structured in five parts. Section I gives an overview of

the history of the CWC. Section II focuses on the CWC' s material scope.
This discussion is important in order to determine the items that will fall
under an eventual export control obligation. Section III presents the
main obligations under the CWC, while Section IV deals exclusively
with the specific obligations pertaining to export controls. The imple-

mentation of these specific obligations-which, for the purposes of this
article, are referred to as transfer rules-is the focus of Section V.
3

I. HISTORY"

On September 3, 1992, after more than two decades of negotiations, 4 the Conference on Disarmament (CD) adopted the final report of
11. Perry Robinson (1995), supra note 10, at 45.
12. See infra note 151.
13. For a more detailed overview of the CWC negotiations history, see Julian Perry
Robinson, The negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention: a historicaloverview, in
THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION-IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 17-36 (M.
Bothe et al. eds., 1998); Ronzitti, supra note 10, at 883-85.
14. From a historic viewpoint, it is important to note that the ideas of prohibiting chemical weapons, on the one hand, and biological weapons, on the other, have always been closely
intertwined. A first milestone towards their complete prohibition was set in 1925, with the
adoption of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571. Due
to WW II and the emergence of the Cold War, is was however only in the second half of the
1960s that the project of a comprehensive treaty framework prohibiting chemical and biological weapons activities gained new momentum. Initial attempts to create a convention covering
both weapons types were soon abandoned, mainly due to U.S. and British resistance. Nevertheless, the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583 (hereinafter: BTWC] was regarded as a "first possible step
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its Ad-Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons 5 and transmitted the report to the United Nations General Assembly (U.N.G.A.). The report
contained, in its Appendix, the finalized text of the CWC. On November
30, 1992, the U.N.G.A. adopted resolution 47/39 without a vote, commending the CWC and calling upon
all states to sign it and become
6
parties at the earliest possible date.
The CWC opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. It entered into force on April 29, 1997, 180 days after the date of deposition
of the 65th instrument of ratification."'
II. MATERIAL

SCOPE

In order to determine the items covered by an eventual export control obligation under the CWC, the CWC's material scope must be
defined. An initial hint as to its contents can be found in the CWC's
title, which indicates that it deals with materials falling within the general category of chemical weapons.
The term "chemical weapons" is defined in Article II.. The provision reads:
For the purposes of this Convention, "Chemical Weapons"
means the following, together or separately:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the
types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death
or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a
result of the employment of such munitions and devices;

towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons ..." BTWC Preamble 8.
15. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on
Disarmament,U.N. Doc. CD/I 170 (26 August 1992).
16. See G.A. Res. 39, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/47/49
(30 November 1992).
17. See CWC, supra note 22, art. XXI.1, 32 I.L.M. at 821. Hungary deposited the 65th
instrument of ratification on October 31, 1996. For states depositing their instruments of ratification after April 29, 1997, the Convention enters into force on the 30th day following the
date of deposit. See id. at art. XXI.2.
18. The term "material scope," as it is used in this article, refers to the (tangible and intangible) materials covered by the CWC.
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(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified
in subparagraph (b). 9
The wording and structure of Article II.1 allow for three introductory observations. First, the CWC subjects three categories of materials
to the definition of "chemical weapons":
(1) toxic chemicals and their precursors (hereinafter: TCPs);
(2) specifically designed munitions and devices; and
(3) specifically designed equipment.20
Second, the provision stipulates that any combination of materials
falling under the three categories also constitutes a chemical weapon.21
This is emphasized by the expression "together or separately" in the in.22
troductory sentence of Article 11.
Third, the text of Article 11.1 allows for the determination of a hierarchy between the three categories of materials. Given the fact that subparagraph (c) elaborates on the materials referred to in sub-paragraph
(b), while sub-paragraph (b) builds upon the materials mentioned in subparagraph (a), it can be concluded that the materials mentioned in subparagraph (a)-that is, TCPs-represent the core of the definition of
chemical weapons. The materials mentioned in sub-paragraphs (b) and
(c), on the other hand, must be understood as expanding the notion of
chemical weapons in two steps: first into the realm of munitions and devices, and from there into the realm of equipment.
These three introductory observations allow for the better understanding of the term "chemical weapons" as used in the CWC. However,
they do not illustrate how the term relates to the CWC's material scope.
In particular, they leave unanswered the following four questions:
(1)

To what extent do the three categories of materials listed in
the definition of chemical weapons fall under the material
scope of the CWC?

(2)

Is their inclusion in the material scope of the CWC contingent upon their being defined as chemical weapons?

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
together

CWC, supra note 2, art. IL , 32 I.L.M. at 804.
See id.
See id.
Id.
The hierarchical order is somewhat mitigated by the fact that each of the materialsor separately-qualify as chemical weapons.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

(3)

[Vol. 21:393

Is it correct to say that the material scope of the CWC covers
chemical weapons?

(4) Is it possible that the material scope of the CWC covers
materials other than those explicitly listed in the definition
of chemical weapons?
The present section intends to answer these questions. For this purpose, it is divided into three sub-sections. Sub-section A examines the
extent to which TCPs fall under the CWC's material scope. Sub-section
B does so in regard to munitions, devices, and equipment. Finally, Subsection C addresses the question of whether other materials mentioned in
the definition of chemical weapons are also covered by the CWC's material scope.
A. Toxic Chemicals and Their Precursors(TCPs)
The terms "toxic chemicals" and "precursors" represent, as has been
indicated, the core components of the definition of chemical weapons.
The following analysis therefore first examines the materials that fall
under these two terms. Second, it explores whether the CWC's scope
covers these materials under any circumstance, or only in situations that
allow for their qualification as chemical weapons. It is the exception
mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of Article 11.1 that makes this second
inquiry necessary. According to the wording of this clause, TCPs are
excluded from being defined as chemical weapons when "intended for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and
quantities are consistent with such purposes." 24 Therefore, materials falling under the category of "toxic chemicals and their precursors" may or
may not qualify as chemical weapons. This raises the question of
whether they are included in the CWC's material scope even if they are
not defined as chemical weapons. Finally, it elaborates on the notion of
''purposes not prohibited under this Convention."
1. Toxic Chemicals
According to Article 11.2, the term "toxic chemical" means "[a]ny
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals."'

24. CWC, supra note 2, art. Il(a), 32 I.L.M. at 804.
25. CWC, supra note 2, art. 11.2, 32 I.L.M. at 805 (emphasis added).
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On the basis of this definition, a chemical must be considered toxic

when fulfilling, cumulatively, three conditions. It must have:
(1) the ability (expressed by the word "can"), through its
chemical action on life forms,
(2)

to cause temporary incapacitation, permanent harm or death

(3)

to humans or animals.26

Given the fact that any chemical-provided that its quantity is high
enough-can cause harm or death to humans or animals, it must be concluded that the term "toxic chemical" as used in Article 11.1(a) covers
virtually all chemicals.2 ' From a contextual viewpoint, one can even argue that anti-plant agents such as herbicides are covered, in spite of the
fact that Article 11.2 merely refers to humans or animals. Indeed, there is
little doubt that herbicides, if applied in a sufficiently high quantity, can
cause death or harm to humans or animals.28
26. Id.
27. See also Perry Robinson (1995), supra note 10, at 2.
28. Whether anti-plant agents fall under the CWC's material scope is, however, debated.
From a textual viewpoint, one could indeed argue in favor of exclusion. CWC art. 1.2 lacks
an explicit reference to plants. CWC, supra note 2, art. H.1, 32 I.L.M. 804-5. Also, the
wording of Paragraph 7 of the Convention's Preamble refers to the prohibition under other
international instruments of the use of herbicides as a "method of warfare." (These instruments are listed infra.) CWC, supra note 2, Preamble, 32 I.L.M. at 804. In so doing, it
suggests that the CWC-due to the exclusion of herbicides from its material scope-cannot
serve as legal basis for such a prohibition. However, a contextual analysis of the CWC supports the inclusion of herbicides in the Convention's material scope, for three reasons. First,
accounts of the CWC negotiations indicate that the proposals made by some countries to exclude herbicides remained undecided throughout the negotiations due to the strong opposition
by others. See KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 31 n.25. Second, the exclusion lacks a
convincing rationale. Commonly, it is argued that an exclusion would facilitate the use of
toxic chemicals for permitted military purposes (including, for instance, the clearing of airfields or perimeters along military facilities). However, this argument is untenable in light of
CWC art. 1.9(c). CWC, supra note 2, art. 1.9(c), 32 I.L.M. 806. This provision explicitly
permits chemical activities for military purposes if such activities are not aimed at harming or
killing humans or animals by means of a chemical's toxic qualities. See id. Third, and most
importantly, any special treatment of herbicides in the realm of prohibited activities would
clearly violate the spirit of the CWC and is therefore inadmissible in accordance with art.
19(c) in conjunction with art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, 8 I.L.M. 679. Inadmissibility is further underscored by CWC art. XX11, which excludes
reservations to the Convention's prohibitions. CWC, supra note 2, art. XXII, 32 I.L.M. at
801. Therefore, if a military activity, though officially not aimed at chemical weapon purposes, nevertheless may have side-effects allowing for its qualification as chemical weapon
activity (such as causing harm or death to humans or animals), the spirit of the CWC clearly
asks for its prohibition. In the realm of military activities, therefore, the principle in dubio pro
prohibitione prevails over the principle in dubio pro libertate. This conclusion, in turn, requires that herbicides be covered by the CWC's material scope. The use of Agent Orange by
the United States during the Vietnam War illustrates the need to regard herbicides as included
in the Convention's material scope. From a military standpoint, it seems in fact plausible to
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The second sentence of Article 11.2 underscores the universal coverage of chemicals by the notion "toxic chemicals." It makes clear that the
definition of a chemical as toxic does not depend on questions of origin,
method or place of production. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the
term "toxic chemical" as referred to in Article 11. 1(a) covers the totality
of chemicals, regardless of whether:
*
they have been produced synthetically or by living organisms such as toxins;" or
•
they have been produced in and disseminated by any novel
weapon types such as binary or multicomponent weapons.3O
Before proceeding to the definition of the term "precursor," it should
be noted that the CWC lists a number of toxic chemicals in its Annex on
Chemicals.31 The chemicals are contained in three lists, referred to as
Schedules 1, 2, and 332 These lists can be modified at any time in accordance with a special, simplified amendment procedure.33

argue that the toxic properties of Agent Orange were not used to harm or kill humans or animals. However, in light of the recent evaluations showing that roughly one million
Vietnamese, including 100,000 children born after the war, still suffer from negative longterm effects caused by Agent Orange, it would be perverse to qualify the use of Agent Orange
as permitted military activity. (Note: The international instruments explicitly prohibiting the
use of herbicides as method of warfare include the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, by means of its arts. 35.3 and 55; the
BTWC, supra note 14, by means of interpretative remarks concerning art. I in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the BTWC, U.N. Doc. BWC/Conf.
111/23 (1991) at 2, and in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties
to the BTWC, U.N. Doc. BWC/Conf. IV/9 (1996) at 14-15; and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,
May 18, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 333, by means of art. I and the annexed Understanding Relating to
Article I.)
29. See also KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 31. Toxins equally fall under the
material scope of the BTWC. The resulting overlap between CWC and BTWC is however to
be welcomed in light of the increasing overlap between organic and non-organic production
methods of chemicals. In fact, an increasing number of toxins today can be synthesized in
laboratories without resorting to natural organisms. Simultaneously, certain chemicals traditionally produced in chemical synthesis today are manufactured by means of micro-biological
methods.
30. CWC art. II, paragraphs 1 and 2, even covers chemicals produced in weapon types
yet unknown. See KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 31.
31. See CWC, supra note 2, Annex on Chemicals, 32 I.L.M. at 822.
32. For an insightful discussion of the Schedules as well as of the AG list of chemical
weapon precursors, see Robert J. Mathews, A Comparison of the Australia Group List of
Chemical Weapon Precursorsand the CWC Schedules of Chemicals, 21 CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION BULL. 1-3 (1993).
33. See CWC, supra note 2, art. XV.4, in connection with art. XV.5, 32 I.L.M. at 820.
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As shown in greater detail below, the Schedules do not serve as the
basis for a definition of the term "chemical weapons." Rather, they
must be understood as listing certain sensitive chemicals for verification
purposes. In fact, while the CWC completely prohibits the transfer of
chemical weapons, the transfer of scheduled chemicals remains permitted within the regulatory framework of specific transfer rules. 35 Given
the fact that different transfer rules apply to each of the three Schedules,
the Schedules are of particular importance for the verification of transfer
activities with such chemicals. A parenthetical note to Article 11.2
stresses this fact, stating that the toxic chemicals are listed in the Schedules "for the application of verification measures."36 Further evincing the
verification purpose of the Schedules, the chapeau of Part B to the Annex on Chemicals states, "For the purpose of implementing this
Convention, these Schedules identify chemicals for the application of
verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification
Annex."37 The provision further stipulates that "[p]ursuant to Article H1,
subparagraph 1 (a), these Schedules do not constitute a definition of
chemical weapons."3
2. Precursors
The term "precursor" is defined in Article 11.3 as "[a]ny chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever
method of a toxic chemical. This includes39any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.,
Article 11.3 affirms, though in a way that creates more confusion
than clarity, the all-inclusive character of the phrase "toxic chemicals
and their precursors" used in Article 11.1(a). According to its wording,
any chemical reactant used at any time in the process of manufacturing a
toxic chemical must be regarded as a precursor.
Confusion arises due to the fact that the provision introduces the
distinction between "toxic chemicals" and "precursors" in an obvious
attempt to differentiate between two groups of chemicals: those that are
"toxic" and those that are not toxic, but can be used for the production of

34. See infra pp. 27-5 1.
35. The transfer rules applicable to scheduled chemicals are listed infra pp. 27-51. Regarding the prohibition of chemical weapon transfers, see infra pp. 24-47.

36. CWC, supra note 2, art. 1.2, 32 I.L.M. at 805.
37. CWC, supra note 2, Annex on Chemicals, pt. B, Schedule of Chemicals, 32 I.L.M. at
822.
38. Regarding the distinction between the term "chemical weapon" and the term "toxic
chemical," see infra Part 1I.A.3.
39. CWC, supra note 2, art. 1.3, 32 I.L.M. at 805.
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toxic chemicals. In light of the before-mentioned, all-inclusive coverage
of the term "toxic chemicals," this distinction is troublesome. Indeed, the
question arises why the CWC subjects all chemicals to the definition of
"toxic chemicals" only to exclude the so-called precursor chemicals
from that very definition.
Only one plausible answer can be given to this question. The separate mentioning of precursors in the CWC makes sense insofar as it
stresses that any chemical falls under the notion of "toxic chemicals and
their precursors." However, insofar as it attempts to establish a difference between toxic and non-toxic chemicals, it appears redundant and
contradictory. Redundant, because precursor chemicals are already covered by the all-inclusive notion of "toxic chemicals." Contradictory,
because their coverage by the notion "toxic chemicals" does not allow
for their qualification as non-toxic.
As in the case of toxic chemicals, a number of precursors is listed in
the three Schedules in the Convention's Annex on Chemicals. Again, it
must be emphasized that these lists must be regarded as verification
guidelines rather than definitions of chemical weapons. It is the following analysis that clarifies the extent to which the definition of chemical
weapons differs from both the notions of "toxic chemicals" and
"'precursors."
3. Relationship between TCPs and the
Definition of Chemical Weapons
The preceding discussion aimed to define the materials falling under
the phrase "toxic chemicals and their precursors" as used in Article
11.1(a). It concluded that the totality of chemicals is covered by this
phrase. What remains to be examined is the relationship between the
totality of chemicals and the definition of chemical weapons.
On the basis of what has been said so far, three observations can be
made in regard to this relationship. First, the CWC defines the totality of
chemicals as chemical weapons. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that Article 11.2 and 3 subject all chemicals to the notion of "toxic
chemicals and their precursors," while Article 1.1(a) subjects all toxic
chemicals and their precursors to the definition of chemical weapons.40
40. Cwc, supra note 2, art. I, 32 I.L.M. at 804-05. Rather than limiting the freedom of
action by means of a partial prohibition, the CWC incorporates a general prohibition as point
of departure. This approach reflects the interesting tendency in the realm of nonproliferation
to emphasize the principle in dubio pro prohibitione rather than the principle in dubio pro
libertate. For further reflections on the principle in dubio pro prohibitione,see supra note 28;
ULRICH KARPENSTEIN, EUROPAISCHES EXPORTKONTROLLRECHT FOR DUAL-USE-GOTER

246-

47, 256-57 (1998). See also Interim Guidelines Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction
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However, the definition of all chemicals as chemical weapons is
only of an a priori character. Due to their essential dual-use nature, most
chemicals indeed have legitimate commercial applications.4 , It is precisely for this reason that Article II.l(a), by means of its middle
sentence, excludes from the definition of chemical weapons those TCPs
42
that are "intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.,
This leads to the second observation. It is important to note that according to Article 11.1(a), the principal criterion determining whether
TCPs qualify or not as chemical weapons is the intended end-use (enduse criterion).4 ' Although the totality of chemicals is a priori subject to
the definition of chemical weapons and thus to the wide range of prohibitions applicable to these weapons, TCPs indeed remain qualified as
chemical weapons only if their intended end-use is prohibited under the
Convention.44
The end-use criterion is, however, not the only criterion in the definition of a TCP as chemical weapon. As indicated by the phrase "as long
as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes' 5 in Article
11.1(a), a TCP can be excluded from being considered a chemical
weapon only if a second criterion is fulfilled. This second criterionwhich may be called the "consistency criterion"-stipulates that in addition to being intended for "purposes not prohibited," the type and
quantity of the concerned chemical must not put into question its use for
such purposes.
This leads to the third and final observation. Whether a TCP qualifies as a chemical weapon under Article .1(a) thus depends not only on
(May 29, 1992) <http:llprojects.sipri.se/expcon/unp5_washington92.htm> [hereinafter Interim
Guidelines]. According to Points 5 and 7 of the Interim Guidelines, which were issued by the

five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the five states shall not export equipment, material, services or technology which could be used in the manufacture of chemicals
and biological weapons (CBWs) "except when satisfied, for example, by recipient country
guarantees or confirmation by the recipient, that such exports would not contribute to the

development or acquisition of chemical weapons." Id.
41. The most recent U.N. report concerning the state of the world chemical industry re-

flects well the importance of chemicals in the realm of legitimate commercial activities.
According to the report, the world chemical production in 1998 rose by 2.4 per cent to nearly
$1,500 billion. See Lye Ching Lam, InternationalEconomics and Politics, FIN. TIMES, July
16, 1999, at 6.
42. See CWC, supra note 2, art. 11.1(a), 11.9, 32 I.L.M. 804-06 for "purposes not prohibited under this Convention." A thorough discussion of these purposes takes place further
below. See infra Part II.A.3.
43. Similarly, Krutzsch & Trapp conclude that "Article 11 sets as the ultimate criterion
for defining a chemical as a chemical weapon its intended purpose..." See KRUTZSCH &
TRAPP, supra note 10, at 31 (emphasis added). Due to this emphasis on the purpose, the criterion is also referred to as "general purpose criterion."
44. CWC, supra note 2, art. ILIl(a), 32 I.L.M. at 804.

45. Id.
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the subjective criterion concerning its intended end-use (end-use criterion), but also on an objective criterion concerning the consistency of its
type and quantity with the intended end-use (consistency criterion).
Figure 1 illustrates the complex relationship between the chemicals
falling within the category of "toxic chemicals and their precursors," on
the one hand, and the definition of chemical weapons, on the other.
FIGURE I: RELATION BETWEEN

TCPs

AND THE

DEFINITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

and if

of types and quantities
consistent with such
purposes (consistency
criterion)
the

EXCLUDED
FROM BEING DEFINED AS
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
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With a determination of the relationship between TCPs and the definition of chemical weapons, it is now possible to give some preliminary
answers to the first three of the four questions listed in the introduction
to this section.6 The first question asked to what extent the materials
listed in Article 11.1 fall under the CWC's material scope. As far as TCPs
are concerned, the right answer is "completely." As has been demonstrated, the CWC includes the totality of chemicals in its material scope.
This finding makes it possible to answer the second of the initial
questions, whether the inclusion of the materials listed in Article 11.1 in
the CWC's material scope is contingent upon their being defined as
chemical weapons. In regard to TCPs, this is obviously not the case.
TCPs remain at all times covered by the material scope of the CWC,
even though they may be excluded from being defined as chemical
weapons if used for "purposes not prohibited. 47
On the basis of this conclusion, the third of the four initial questions
can be addressed. This question concerned the issue of whether the
CWC's material scope can be said to cover chemical weapons. For the
following reason, such terminology is untenable. The observation that
the CWC's material scope covers chemical weapons is wrong because
TCPs, although always subject to the material scope, may under certain
specific circumstances not qualify as chemical weapons. The definition
of "chemical weapons" therefore must be understood as a specific, additional qualification of the goods that fall under the CWC's material
scope. It cannot be said to represent the definition of the material scope
itself.
4. The Notion of "Purposes Not Prohibited"
The preceding analysis has shown that the totality of chemicalssubject to the notion of TCPs-is at any time covered by the CWC's
material scope. Furthermore, it has demonstrated that although all
chemicals fall a priori under the definition of chemical weapons in Article II.
1(a), they may be excluded from that definition when intended "for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention." 8 That their exclusion
eventually depends on their types and quantities-i.e., the consistency
criterion-has also been stressed.
The present discussion focuses on the definition of the phrase "for
purposes not prohibited." As will be shown below, this phrase plays an
important role in connection with transfer control obligations deriving
46. See supra Part U.A.1.
47. CWC, supra note 2, art. 11.1(a), 32 I.L.M. at 804.
48. Id.
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from the CWC. Given the fact that the CWC prohibits any activities with
chemical weapons (including their transfer), 9 TCPs may be transferred
only if they qualify for exclusion from the chemical weapons definition
in Article II.l(a).5° Since they may qualify for such exclusion only
"when intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,"5
their transfer directly depends on how the term "for purposes not prohibited" is interpreted.
The term "for purposes not prohibited" is defined in Article 11.9 of
the CWC. According to this provision, the term covers activities for:
(a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or
other peaceful purposes;
(b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related
to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against
chemical weapons;
(c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical
weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of
chemicals as a method of warfare;
(d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes."
According to sub-paragraph (a), all activities for "peaceful purposes" must be considered activities "for purposes not prohibited." As
indicated by the provision's wording, such activities include, but are not
limited to, industrial, agricultural, research, medical and pharmaceutical
activities. The words "or other peaceful purposes" at the end of the provision indeed clarify that the enumeration of these five activities is nonexhaustive.53 The word "peaceful," on the other hand, makes clear that
an activity, in order to qualify as activity "for peaceful purposes," always must be of a non-military character.- '
Given the essential dual-use character of chemicals, the distinction
between permitted peaceful and prohibited military activities at times is
difficult. Activities with chemicals may easily fall into a gray zone.

49. CWC, supra note 2, art. 1.1, 32 I.L.M. at 804.
50. CWC, supra note 2, art. IH.I(a), 32 I.L.M. at 804.

51. Id.
52. CWC, supra note 2, art. 1.9, 32 I.L.M. at 805-06 (emphasis added).

53. See also KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 41.
54. Legitimate military activities with chemicals are dealt with under sub-paragraph (c)
rather than sub-paragraph (a) of CWC art. IH.9. CWC, supra note 2, art. 11.9, 32 I.L.M. at

805-06.
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Sub-paragraphs (b)-(d) qualify a limited number of such gray zone ac'
tivities as activities "for purposes not prohibited."55
Sub-paragraph (b) allows states parties to engage in activities for
protective purposes. The term "protective purposes" must be understood
in the broadest possible sense, including civilian measures against industrial poisoning and the like, as well as military measures against the
use of chemical weapons by other countries. 6 Protective military measures, however, must be of a purely defensive character. 7
Sub-paragraph (c) includes among the activities "for purposes not
prohibited" any activity with chemicals for "military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use
of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare."58 Accordingly, the CWC permits chemical activities for military purposes,
provided (1) that the chemicals involved are not used for chemical
weapon purposes, and (2) that it is not the toxic property of the chemicals that leads to the harming or killing of enemy humans or animals.59
Thus, permitted military purposes pertain to the use of chemicals for
conventional weapons purposes, such as the production of rocket fuels,
explosives, incendiaries or smoke-generating ammunitions."° Furthermore, as already indicated, the use of defoliators to clear the perimeters
of military facilities 61may also be regarded as a military purpose permitted under the CWC.
Finally, sub-paragraph (d) allows for chemical activities used for
law enforcement and domestic riot control." Though a harming impact
on humans or animals cannot be denied, activities involving tear gases

55. CWC, supra note 2, art. 11.9, 32 I.L.M. at 805-06.
56. See KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 41.

57. In this context, the question arises whether the stockpiling of chemicals for military
deterrence purposes can be regarded as serving a legitimate protective military purpose. The
question must be answered in the negative. As means of deterrence, chemicals are aimed at a
retaliatory rather than defensive purpose. Correspondingly, they fall under the CWC's definition of chemical weapons the use and stockpiling of which is prohibited according to CWC
art. 1.1(a). CWC, supra note 394, art. I.I(a), 32 I.L.M. at 804.
58. CWC, supra note 2, art. II.9(c), 32 I.L.M. at 806.
59. Id.; see also CWC, supra note 2, art. 1.2, 32 I.L.M. at 805.
60. See KRITZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 42.
61. See supra note 28. However, as soon as defoliators risk to kill or harm enemy humans or animals, their toxic properties-regardless of the intention of the applying state--can
be associated with chemical warfare. According to the previously mentioned principle in
dubio proprohibitione,the CWC prohibits their use in such situations. See supra note 40.
62. See KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 42. Article 11.7 defines riot control agents
as follows: "Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans
sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following
termination of exposure." CWC, supra note 2, art. 11.7, at 32 I.L.M. 805.
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and the like are generally permitted.63 According to Article 1.5, each state
party is, however, barred from using riot control agents "as a method of
warfare. ' 6
In sum, it must be kept in mind that although the CWC excludesby means of the phrase "for purposes not prohibited"- certain activities
with chemicals from being considered chemical weapon activities, this
exclusion does not mean that the chemicals involved in these permitted
activities no longer fall under the material scope of the CWC. Regardless
of the activities for which they are used, chemicals always remain subject to the CWC's material scope. The expression "for purposes not
prohibited" does not play a role regarding the definition of the material
scope. It is relevant only for the distinction between chemicals and
chemical weapons, and thus for the determination of permitted and prohibited transfer activities. As has already been indicated, the CWC
prohibits the transfer of chemical weapons, while allowing for the transfer of chemicals for purposes not prohibited within the regulatory
framework of specific transfer rules.65
B. Munitions, Devices, and Equipment
The previous paragraph has shown that TCPs, covered by the phrase
"toxic chemicals and their precursors" in Article 11. 1(a), may or may not
qualify as chemical weapons. As described, chemicals are excluded from
being defined as chemical weapons when fulfilling two specific criteria.
However, it has also been stressed that their possible exclusion from
being considered as chemical weapons does not change the fact that they
always remain subject to the CWC's material scope.
The situation is similar with regard to munitions, devices, and
equipment. According to sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 1. 1, these
items fall under the definition of chemical weapons only when they are
"specifically designed to cause death or other harm" by releasing toxic
chemicals. 66 Conversely, they do not qualify as chemical weapons when
63. The term "law enforcement," as it is used here, implies that the use of riot control

agents by U.N. peace-keeping troops is legitimate. However, it is important to note that any
use of such agents is at any time subject to the consistency criterion mentioned in CWC, supra note 394, art. IL.l(a), 32 I.L.M. at 804.
64. CWC, supra note 2, art. 1.5, 32 I.L.M. at 804.
65. About these transfer rules, see infra Part IV.B.

66. The Chairman of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons stressed this point in
the Committee's final report, by placing the following explanation on record: "With regard to
Article II: The definition of the term 'chemical weapons' in Article II is formulated broadly to
cover not only toxic chemicals and their precursors, but also specifically-designed means of
delivery. The term 'munitions' refers to items that utilize directly or indirectly an explosive to
disseminate a toxic chemical on the battlefield. The term 'devices' refers to items that use
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no such specific design is given. However, regardless of whether they
are "specifically designed" or not, they always fall under the CWC's
material scope. Therefore, their inclusion in the material scope of the
CWC is not contingent upon their being defined as chemical weapons."
This finding allows for the final assessment of the first three questions mentioned in the introduction to this section. First, it can be
concluded that TCPs, as well as munitions, devices, and equipment, are
always and completely covered by the CWC's material scope. Second,
their coverage is not contingent upon their being defined as chemical
weapons. TCPs, munitions, devices, and equipment are subject to the
material scope of the CWC regardless of whether they qualify as chemical weapons or not. Third, it is therefore mistaken to say that the
material scope of the CWC covers chemical weapons. Rather, it is more
accurate to conclude that certain items falling under the material scope
of the CWC may under specific conditions qualify as chemical weapons.
The fourth question concerns the issue of whether materials other
than the three categories of materials mentioned in the definition of
chemical weapons may also fall under the material scope of the CWC.
C. Other Materials
As indicated in the previous discussion, certain products fall under
the material scope of the CWC in spite of the fact that they do not qualify as chemical weapons. Aiming at the best possible prevention of
chemical proliferation, the drafters strove to have the CWC's material
scope cover not only those materials effectively representing chemical
non-explosive means to disseminate a toxic chemical on the battlefield. The term 'equipment'
refers to, inter alia, items that are part of a chemical weapons delivery system but do not actually contain toxic chemicals or precursors. It does not refer to general purpose delivery
systems that are common in all modem armed forces that can be used to deliver different
types of ammunition containing, inter alia, conventional explosives, but which do not contain
any special features designed specifically for the delivery of chemical munitions or devices."
U.N. Doc. CD/l 170 (26 August 1992), 36 (emphasis added). It should be noted that paragraph 36 was negotiated among interested delegations before being placed on record. It
commanded consensus.
67. It is on the basis of this observation that one may call the situation concerning munitions, devices, and equipment similar to that regarding chemicals. However, it has certainly
not escaped the attentive reader that there also exists a major conceptual difference between
the treatment of these two groups of materials in the CWC. This difference, which concerns
the qualification of the particular goods as "chemical weapons," shall not go unmentioned. As
previously shown, chemicals qualify a priori as chemical weapons, may however be excluded
from the definition when end-use and consistency criteria are fulfilled. Contrary to this, munitions, devices, and equipment are a priori are excluded from being qualified as chemical
weapons. Only when these materials fulfil the criterion of being "specifically designed"
(specificity criterion) are they included in the definition. The principle in dubio pro prohibitione
thus does not apply in the realm of munitions, devices and equipment. See supra note 40.
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weapons, but also those possessing an inherent potential to contribute to
the proliferation of chemical weapons.
Given this goal, the question arises whether the three categories of
goods encountered so far-that is, TCPs, munitions and devices, and
equipment-are sufficient to cover the totality of goods that have a potential to contribute to chemical proliferation. Obviously, this is not the
case. For instance, the following dual-use goods do not fall within the
three categories even though they are apt to serve chemical weapon purposes:
*
machines, in particular chemical manufacturing equipment
(valves, pipes, control devices, specially coated vessels, etc.);
"
financial resources; and
*

intangible goods such as technology. 6'

The CWC refrains from explicitly referring to these types of goods
that, although apt to serve chemical weapon purposes, may never qualify
as chemical weapons. However, it does implicitly include these goods in
its material scope, by means of prohibiting its states parties to assist in
the development, production, and transfer of chemical weapons. As
shown in greater detail below, the prohibition on assisting in chemical
weapon production, anchored in Article I.l(d), indeed includes in the
material scope of the CWC all those materials, machines, financial resources and intangible goods that are apt to assist in the proliferation of
chemical weapons.69
D. Summary
In sum, it can be concluded that the material scope of the CWC covers two categories of materials. The first category are the items that
qualify as chemical weapons under specific circumstances (that is, if
intended for prohibited purposes, inconsistent with permitted purposes,
68. The term "technology" is commonly defined as specific information necessary for
the development, production or use of a product. As such, it covers the terms "technical data"

and "technical assistance." Technical data includes blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or

recorded on devices such as disks, tapes or read-only memories. Technical assistance, on the
other hand, may take the form of instruction, training, consulting services or any other form of
transmission of skills and working knowledge. Furthermore, it covers the transferof technical
data. For similar definitions of technology, see the AGs Control List of Dual-Use Chemical
ManufacturingFacilities and Equipment, and Related Technology (last updated Aug. 18, 1998)

<http:l/projects.sipri.selcbw/researrhlAG-cw-equipment.html>; Wassenaar Arrangement, July
1996 (last modified Dec. 3, 1999) <http://www.wassenaar.org/list/Def%2O-%2099.pdf>
[hereinafter WA].
69. See infra pp. 25-7.
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or specifically designed). These items include TCPs, munitions and devices, and equipment. The second category are those materials, financial
resources and intangible goods that, without qualifying as chemical
weapons, may serve chemical weapon purposes.

I. MAIN OBLIGATIONS
The CWC contains three main disarmament obligations. First, it
prohibits the use of chemical weapons (non-use obligation). Second, it
requires states parties to eliminate existing chemical weapons stockpiles
and production facilities (elimination obligation). Third, and most important for current purposes, it aims at preventing the proliferation of
chemical weapons (nonproliferation obligation).
Article 1. 1(b) and (c), in conjunction with Paragraph 6 of the Preamble, set forth the non-use obligation. Accordingly, states parties are
required to abstain not only from the immediate use of chemical weapons, but also from engaging in any sort of military preparation directed
toward the future use of such weapons.
Articles 1.2-1.4, IV, and V impose the elimination obligation. These
provisions require states parties to destroy the totality of their chemical
weapons stockpiles and production facilities. 0
Finally, the nonproliferation obligation concerning chemical weapons finds expression in Article 1.1(a) and (d) and Article VI. Article
1.1(a) and (d) are aimed at the immediate nonproliferation of chemical
weapons. While sub-paragraph (a) prohibits states parties from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling or transferring, directly or
indirectly, chemical weapons, sub-paragraph (d) forbids states parties to
assist in any chemical weapon activity. Article VI, on the other hand,
contains several sub-paragraphs that foster chemical nonproliferation in
an indirect way.71 Given the fact that the clause is primarily directed at
regulating chemical activities not prohibited under the CWC, its nonproliferation concern may be termed "auxiliary." Indeed, Article VI
pertains to chemical nonproliferation only insofar as it. contains certain
rules aimed at ensuring that the materials whose transfer is permitted
under the CWC will not be abused for chemical weapon purposes.
The following analysis focuses exclusively on the nonproliferation
obligation. It is furthermore limited to those nonproliferation obligations

70. The elimination of all chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities
must be concluded on April 29, 2007. See CWC, supra note 2, arts. IV.6, V.8, 32 I.L.M. 807,
809.
71. CWC, supra note 2, art. VI.3-5, 7-8, 32 I.L.M. at 809-10.
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that pertain to export controls. This specific set of nonproliferation obligations is referred to as "CWC transfer rules." The discussion of the
CWC transfer rules is integral for present purposes, because-as further
discussed below-the obligation to implement the CWC transfer rules
requires states parties implicitly to establish national export controls.72

IV. SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS PERTAINING TO EXPORT CONTROLS:

CWC TRANSFER RULES
As already indicated, the CWC transfer rules are contained in Article
1.1(a) and (d) and Article VI of the CWC. The latter provision also refers
to the CWC's Verification Annex (VA), which elaborates on the Article
VI transfer rules." Table 1 gives an overview of the CWC transfer rules.
TABLE I

CWC TRANSFER RULES
Immediate Nonproliferation

Auxiliary Nonproliferationof

of CWs

CWs

ARTICLE I CWC

ARTICLE VI CWC & VA

PARA. I(A): Transfer prohibition for
chemical weapons

PARA. 3: Transfer rules for Schedule 1
chemicals - VA PART VI

PARA. 1(D): Prohibition on assisting in PARA. 4: Transfer rules for Schedule 2
proliferation activities such as chemical chemicals -- VA PART VII
weapons development, production or
transfer
PARA. 5: Transfer rules for Schedule 3
chemicals -9 VA PART VIII

PARA. 7: Initial declaration duty
regarding transfers of Schedule 2 & 3
chemicals

-

VA PARTS VII AND

VIII
PARA. 8: Annual declaration duty
regarding transfers of Schedule 1-3
_

__

chemicals -- VA PARTS VI-VIII

72. See infra Part V.B.
73. According to CWC art. XVII, the Verification Annex [hereinafter VA] must be considered an "integral part" of the Convention. Its provisions thus have a legal effect identical to
that of the CWC's twenty-four articles. See Zedalis, supra note 10, at 145.
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The focus of the inquiry first lies on the two transfer rules established under Article 1.1. Subsequently, the transfer rules contained in
Article VI are examined, in conjunction with the relevant parts of the
VA. Questions regarding the implementation of the CWC transfer rules
are further addressed below.
A. Transfer Rules in Article 1.1
In accordance with the two transfer rules contained in Article 1.1,
this sub-section has a twofold division. The initial discussion is dedicated to the transfer prohibition anchored in sub-paragraph (a). Then,
the assistance prohibition mentioned in Sub-paragraph (d) is elaborated.
1. Article 1. 1(a)
Article 1.1(a) inter alia stipulates that "each State Party" undertake
"never under any circumstances" to "transfer, directly or indirectly,"
"chemical weapons" to "anyone."75 The textual analysis of this clause
indicates, first of all, that the CWC establishes a general transferprohibition for chemical weapons.
The term "transfer" is not defined in the CWC. On the basis of
Black's Law Dictionary, it must however be assumed that its meaning is
broader than that of the term "export." While stating that export means
"[t1o transport merchandise or goods from one country to another in the
course of trade,"76 the dictionary defines transfer as
[t]he sale and every other method, direct or indirect, of disposing
of or parting with property or with an interest therein, or with
the possession thereof.., absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceedings, as a
conveyance, sale payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance,
gift, security or otherwise.77
Based on these two definitions, the following three differences between the two terms can be identified (see also infra, Table 2):

74. See infra Part V.

75. The entire provision reads: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never
under any circumstances: (a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain
chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone." CWC,
supra note 2, art. 1.1 (a), at 32 I.L.M. 804 (Emphasis added).
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (6th ed. 1990).
77. Id. at 1497. Emphasis added.
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(a)

While an export needs to be a transboundary movement, a
transfer can be any movement, either domestic or transboundary;

(b)

While an export represents a commercial transaction of
property from the previous to the new owner, a transfer includes any kind of transaction of property or possession
between any parties.

(c)

While an export concerns only transactions of tangible
goods, a transfer covers transactions of tangible and intangible goods.

TABLE 2
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXPORT AND TRANSFER

rTerm
Dimension

Export

Transfer

GEOGRAPHICAL

Transboundary
movement

Any movement

SUBSTANTIVE

Commercial transaction of
property

Any kind of transaction of
property orpossession

MATERIAL

Tangible goods

Tangible and intangible
goods

That Article 1.1(a) uses the term "transfer" rather than "export" is
not accidental."8 The wording of the provision indeed shows that the
drafters intended to subject the broadest possible range of activities, actors and goods to the prohibition. This is underscored by the terms
"directly or indirectly" and "to anyone." The former term is used to express that all possible ways of transferring chemical weapons are
prohibited (including, for instance, a transfer via an intermediary). 9 The
latter term indicates that the provision prohibits the transfer of chemical
weapons not only to countries, but also to organizations, corporations,
and natural persons.8 0 In light of this analysis, interpretations that con78. The French text of the CWC uses the term "transfdrer."
79. See KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 13-14. It is important to note in this con-

text that brokerage is not covered by CWC art. 1.1(a), but by the prohibition "to assist" in
CWC art. 1.1(d). CWC, supra note 2, art. 1.1.(d), 32 I.L.M. at 804. Regarding brokerage, see
infra Part IV.A.2.
80. See KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 13-14.
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sider the term "transfer" as it is used in the CWC to be synonymous to
the term "export" must be rejected."
2. Article 1. 1 (d)
Article 1.1(d) expands the scope of the general transfer prohibition
contained in Article 1.1 (a) to any material, financial resource, or intangible good suitable for chemical weapon purposes.
It does so by
requiring that "[elach State Party ... undertakes never under any circumstances ... to assist.., in any way anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited" under the CWC"
The term "assistance" is not defined in the CWC. However, the
wording of Article I.1(d) suggests that the notion be interpreted broadly,
covering any kind of assistance given to anyone in the realm of prohibited activities. Prohibited activities include, as has been shown, the
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons.' 4 Taking the vastness of the resulting champ d'application
of Article I.1(d) into account, it can be assumed that the CWC outlaws
any type of domestic and transboundaryassistance in prohibited activities. This interpretation leads to the conclusion that prohibited activities
under Article 1.1(d) include the transboundary movement of any material, financial resource, or intangible good that-provided it is apt for
such purposes-is intended to assist in the development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons.
Article 1.1(d) thus represents a kind of catch-all clause that expands
the CWC's nonproliferation obligation from the core prohibition of activities with chemical weapons to any activity that is apt for and aimed

81. Such misleading interpretations of the term "transfer" can inter alia be found in id. at
418 n. 4; Marauhn, supra note 10, at 490; Zedalis, supra note 10, at 146-47. That the Convention differentiates between transfer and export is further supported by the specific use of
the term "export" in VA Part VII, A.1, and VA Part VIII, A.1. See infra Part IV.B.2.
82. Marauhn mistakenly attributes the expansion of the CWC's transfer prohibition to
CWC art.I.I(c). See Marauhn, supra note 10, at 493. It is however important to note that this
provision does not concern the question of transfers or transboundary assistance.
83. The entire provision reads: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never
under any circumstances: ... (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention." CWC, supra note 2,
art. I.1(a), 32 I.L.M. at 804 (Emphasis added).
84. In this context, it is important to note that the prohibited development of chemical
weapons pertains to "the preparation of the production of chemical weapons .... KRUTZsCH
& TRAPP, supra note 10, at 13. As such, it is to be distinguished from research for purposes
not prohibited under the CWC.
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at chemical proliferation.85 Such activities may include but are not limited to:
•
any kind of brokerage activity;
"

any financial transaction;

*

the offering of any transportation service;

*

any type of military research cooperation;

*

any concession of rights; and
any movement of personnel, technical data or machines/chemical manufacturing equipment.

*

An expansion of the CWC's material scope occurs simultaneously
with the expansion of prohibited activities. As has already been indicated, the material scope of the CWC thus cannot be defined as
including merely those materials that may qualify as chemical weapons.
Rather, it must be understood as incorporating any materials, financial
resources, or intangible goods apt for chemical weapon purposes."
B. Transfer Rules in Article VI and the VA
Like Article I, Article VI and the VA contain transfer rules furthering efforts toward chemical nonproliferation. However, the latter differ
from the former in three respects. First, it was already indicated that the
transfer rules in Article 1.
1 are immediately directed against the proliferation of chemical weapons, while the transfer rules in Article VI and
the VA are auxiliary.7 Unlike Article I, Article VI deals with activities
not prohibited under the CWC. Insofar as the clause establishes transfer
rules, it does so without the primary intent to prohibit chemical weapon
transfers. Rather, its transfer rules aim to ensure that the materials whose
transfer is permitted under the CWC will not be abused for chemical
weapon purposes.
The second difference lies in the materials subject to the two provisions. The transfer rules in Article I cover TCPs, munitions, devices, and
equipment, as well as any materials, financial resources, or intangible
goods with a potential to be used for chemical weapon purposes. The
transfer rules in Article VI, on the other hand, refer only to "toxic
85. Accordingly, we argue further below that aptitude and intent/negligence should represent the criteria on the basis of which national authorities determine whether the assistance
prohibition anchored in CWC art. I.
l(d) has been violated, and whether penal or administrative sanctions should be imposed as consequence of a particular transfer. See infra Part V.C.

86. See supra Part lI.C.
87. See supra Part III and Table I.
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chemicals and their precursors." Materials other than TCPs are therefore
excluded from the scope of these provisions.
Third, the transfer rules in Article VI and the corresponding parts of
the VA differ from those in Article I in that not all of them cover both
the transnational and domestic dimension of transfer. As will be shown
below, the transfer rules regarding Schedules 2 and 3 only concern
transboundary transfers. In two specific cases, their scope is even more
restricted, pertaining only to exports.88
Article VI is structured in eleven paragraphs. Five of its paragraphs
(Paragraphs 3-5, 7 and 8) refer to transfer rules. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5
refer to transfer rules in the VA that prohibit or restrict the legitimate
transfer of TCPs."9 For this purpose, the three paragraphs distinguish
between three categories of TCPs, namely Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals. However, only Paragraph 3 indicates that the provisions in the VA
establish transfer rules. The clause inter alia stipulates that "[e]ach State
Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 1 to the prohibitions on
... transfer ...

as specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex."

Paragraphs 4 and 5, dealing with Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals, refer to
Parts VII and VIII of the VA without explicit mention of transfer prohibitions or restrictions. This lacuna surprises, but is of no importance.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article VI establish an initial and annual declaration obligation for signatory countries, respectively. Though neither
the word "transfer" nor the word "export" are explicitly mentioned in
these paragraphs, analysis of the corresponding VA parts shows that the
declaration obligations pertain to both transfer and export activities.
The following analysis focuses on the contents of the transfer rules
listed in the VA that elaborate on Article Vi. For this purpose, Table 3
gives an initial summary overview. Then, the VA transfer rules are discussed individually and in greater detail.

88. See VA pt. VII.A.1, 32 I.L.M. at 853; VA pt. VII.A.1, 32 I.L.M. at 853. Regarding
the difference between "transfer" and "export", see supra Part W.A. 1.
89. Regarding the paradox of imposing transfer prohibitions on transfers "for purposes
not prohibited," see infra Part V.A.2.
90. CWC, supra note 2, art. VI.3, 32 I.L.M. at 810.
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TABLE 3
VA TRANSFER RULES BASED ON ARTICLE VI CWC

Schedule I
Chemicals
PERMITTED
PURPOSES

Only research,
medical,
pharmaceutical or

Schedule 2
Chemicals

Schedule 3
Chemicals

Any purpose not
Any purpose not
prohibited under the prohibited under the
CWC (Article 11.9) CWC (Article 11.9)

protective purposes
TRANSFER TO

Prohibited

NON-STATE
PARTY

TRANSFER TO
STATE PARTY

Prohibited, unless:
- for allowed

- Before April 29,

- Only ifend-use

2000: only if enduse certificate is

certificate is
provided

provided

- Possible

- After April 29,

prohibition after

2000: prohibited
(Permitted for
allowed purposes)

April29, 2002
(Permitted for
allowed purposes)

purposes;
-type/quantity
consistent with
indicated purposes;
-aggregate amount

of Schedule 1
chemicals in
country of
destination less
than or equal to 1
metric ton
RE-TRANSFER

All recipient states Non-states parties Non-states parties
(i.e. states parties) must not be allowed must not be allowed
must not be allowed to re-transfer
to re-transfer
to re-transfer
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TABLE

3 (CONTINUED)

REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
FOR STATE
PARTIES

Both countries
(No reporting
involved in the
requirement)
transfer must report
to the Technical
Secretariat in
advance

DECLARATION
REQUIREMENTS
FOR STATE
PARTIES

Detailed annual
declarations on
each transferred
Schedule 1
chemical, its
destination and its
purpose must be
submitted to the
Technical
Secretariat

(No reporting
requirement)

Detailed annual
Detailed annual
declarations on
declarations on
each exported
each exported
Schedule 2
Schedule 3
chemical, its
chemical, its
destination and its destination and its
purpose must be
purpose must be
submitted to the
submitted to the
Technical
Technical
Secretariat
Secretariat

1. Part VI of the VA
Part VI of the VA contains the rules applicable to the transfer of
Schedule 1 chemicals. The relevant provisions are listed in Sections A
(General Provisions) and B (Transfers) of Part VI, and establish the following obligations:

(I)

Transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals to non-states parties must

be prohibited.91
(II) Transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals to states parties must in
general be prohibited, unless:
"
the chemicals to be transferred are used for research,
medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes;
*
the types and quantities of the chemicals to be transferred are strictly limited to those which can be
justified for such purposes; 92 and
*
the annual aggregate amount of such chemicals already
acquired and/or used for such purposes in the state

party of destination is equal to or less than one metric
ton."3
91. CwC, supra note 2, VA pt. VI.A.1, 32 I.L.M. at 853.
92. This requirement represents a restatement of the consistency criterion listed in CWC
art. I.I(a). CWC, supra note 2, art. I.I(a), 32 I.L.M. at 84; supra Part II.A.3.
93. CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VI.B.3, 32 I.L.M. at 854. It is in this context important to
note that B.3 only applies to transboundary transfers. This is indicated by the words "outside
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(III) The re-transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals must not be allowed
to the state party of destination. 94
(IV) Transboundary transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals must be reported to the CWC Technical Secretariat at least 30 days in advance by
both countries involved in the transfer; 9
(V) Each state party has to make a detailed annual declaration regarding transboundary (and domestic) transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals.
This declaration must include:
the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical
Abstracts Service registry number (if assigned) of each
transferred Schedule 1 chemical; and
the quantity, recipient and purpose of each transfer. 96
2. Part VII of the VA
Part VII of the VA specifies the transfer rules applicable to Schedule 2
chemicals. The relevant provisions, listed in subsections A (Declarations)
and C (Transfers), require the following:
(I)

Three years after the entry into force of the CWC (that is, on
29 April 2000), the transfer of Schedule 2 chemicals to nonstates parties must be prohibited; 97

(ii) During the three-year interim period, transfers of Schedule 2
chemicals to non-states parties must be accompanied by
end-use certificates declaring
"
that the transferred chemicals will not be used for purposes contrary to the CWC;
*
*

that the transferred chemicals will not be retransferred;
the type, quantity, end-use, and recipient of the transferred chemicals; 9

its territory." The conditions applicable to transboundary transfers are however identical with
those applicable to domestic transfers, due to the reference in B.3 to A.2. A.2 only applies to
domestic transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals. Id. at 853-54.
94. CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VI.B.4, 32 I.L.M. at 854.
95. CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VI.B.5, 32 I.L.M. at 854.
96. CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VI.B.5-6, 32 I.L.M. at 854 (describing how the declaration must be submitted to the Technical Secretariat).
97. CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VII.C.31, 32 I.L.M. at 859.
98. CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VII.C.32, 32 I.L.M. at 859. Regarding end-use certificates, see also OPCW Docs. C-III/Dec.6 and C-III/Dec.7 (Nov. 17, 1998). According to these
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(III) Detailed annual declarations concerning Schedule 2 chemicals must contain information on the quantity and recipient
of each export of such chemicals. 99

3. Part VIII of the VA
Finally, Part VIII of the VA defines the CWC transfer rules applicable to Schedule 3 chemicals. The relevant provisions, listed in Sections
A (Declarations) and C (Transfers) of Part VIII, establish the following
obligations:
(I) Transfers of a Schedule 3 chemical to non-states parties must
be accompanied by a certificate attesting:
"
that the chemical will not be used for purposes contrary to the Convention;
"
that the chemical will not be re-transferred;
*

the type, quantity, end-use(s), and recipient of the
transferred chemical;' °°

(I) Detailed annual declarations concerning Schedule 3 chemicals
must contain information on the quantity and recipient of each export of
such chemicals.1"'

decisions, national transfer control authorities have to require "end-use certificates issued by

the competent government authority" in the recipient country. A certificate issued by the importer or end-user does not satisfy the requirement of VA pt. VII.C.32. In cases in which
importer and end-user are not identical, end-use certificates must contain the name(s) and
address(es) of the end-user(s).
99. CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VII.A.I, 32 I.L.M. at 856. It is interesting to note that
this provision refers to "export" rather than "transfer." Accordingly, it can be assumed that
merely the transboundary movement of Schedule 2 chemicals from an exporter in country A
to an importer in country B must be reported. The limitation of the declaration obligation to
exports is regrettable, seems however justified on the basis of practicability considerations.
Regarding the difference between transfer and export, see supra Part IV.A. 1.
100. CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VIII.C.26-27, 32 I.L.M. at 862. According to C.27, the
Conference of the signatory states to the CWC shall, five years after the entry into force of the
Convention, consider whether transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-states shall also be
prohibited.
101. CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VIII.A.1, 32 I.L.M. at 860. As in the case of Schedule
2 chemicals, the Convention applies here the term "export" instead of the term "transfer,"
thereby indicating that the declaration obligation concerns only transboundary movements of
Schedule 3 chemicals from an exporter in country A to an importer in country B. See supra
note 99.

Michigan JournalofInternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:393

4. Assessment
The listing of the VA transfer rules based on Article VI allows for
the following three observations. First, it is interesting to note that some
transfer rules categorically prohibit the transfer of Schedule 1 and 2
chemicals to non-states parties.'O This prohibition may at first surprise,
given the fact that Article VI CWC deals with "activities not prohibited"
under the CWC. From a textual viewpoint, the transfer prohibitions concerning Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals (in the latter case entering into force
on 29 April 2000) indeed represent a paradox, especially in light of Article VI. 1, which grants each state party the right to transfer chemicals for
legitimate purposes. From a contextual viewpoint, however, the prohibitions are justifiable for two reasons. First, the primary goal of the
prohibitions is not so much the fostering of chemical nonproliferation
than the creation of an incentive for non-member states to join the
CWC' °3 Second, Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals pose a great risk to the
purposes of the Convention. Given the fact that non-states parties are
not bound by the CWC obligations, the danger that Schedule 1 and 2
chemicals transferred to these countries will be abused for chemical
weapon purposes is high enough to justify a transfer prohibition.
A second important observation concerns the limitation of legitimate
purposes in connection with transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals to states
parties. According to Paragraph B.3 of Part VI of the VA, Schedule 1
chemicals may be transferred to states parties only if they are intended
for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes. 5 The
enumeration of allowed purposes, in itself exhaustive, prohibits the
transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals for other "purposes not prohibited" under Article 11.9, such as industrial or law enforcement purposes, or
102. See CWC, supra note 2, VA pts. VI.A.1, VII.C.31, 32 I.L.M. at 853, 859.

103. Especially the U.S. delegation to the CWC negotiations lobbied for the establishment of transfer prohibitions against non-states parties. See Measures to Ensure Universality,
Conference on Disarmament, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, U.N. Doc.
CD/CW/WP.357 (1991). That the transfer prohibitions are intended to stimulate universal
adherence to the CWC is underscored by a Pentagon Statement to the U.S. Congress in May
1994. In this statement, the Pentagon emphasized that "three quarters of the countries believed

to have chemical weapons programmes have signed the [CWC]. The remaining quarter have
isolated themselves. Should they remain outside the Convention after it enters into force, they

will be subject to the trade restrictions on specific chemicals under the CWC." 25 CHEM. &
15 (1994).
104. As clarified in the Convention's Annex on Chemicals, Schedule 1 chemicals pose a

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTIONS BULL.

high risk, while Schedule 2 chemicals pose a significantrisk. CWC, supra note 2, Annex on
Chemicals pts. A.l(b), A.2.(a), 32 I.L.M. at 821-22. For an insightful discussion of the characteristics of the various scheduled chemicals, see Matthews, supra note 32, at 1-2.

105. The same restriction applies to domestic transfers. See CWC, supra note 2, VA pt.
VI.A.2(a), 32 I.L.M. at 854.

Spring 2000]

New Chemical Weapons Convention and Export Controls 425

military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.'O In
doing so, it again raises questions about the grounds of this restriction.
In contrast to the just mentioned transfer prohibitions concerning
non-states parties, the prohibition here applies to states parties. Thus, it
cannot be directed at the creation of an incentive to join the CWC. It appears that the promotion of chemical nonproliferation is the underlying
rationale for the limitation of the "purposes not prohibited" clause in
cases of Schedule 1 transfers to states parties. As clarified in the CWC
Annex on Chemicals, Schedule 1 chemicals in fact have "little or no use
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention."'0 7 Given the high
risk Schedule 1 chemicals pose to the purposes of the CWC, the limitation of legitimate purposes for transfers to other states parties is
appropriate.
The third observation focuses on the question of re-transferlca It has
been indicated that all scheduled chemicals are subject to re-transfer
prohibitions. Interestingly, however, the scope of the three re-transfer
prohibitions contained in the VA is not identical. In fact, the states to be
subject to such prohibitions differ depending on the chemical to be transferred. In case of Schedule 1 transfers, only a state party can be subject
to the re-transfer prohibition.'" On the other hand, only a non-state party
can be subject to the re-transfer prohibition required in connection with
Schedule 2 and 3 transfers. " In other words, states parties transferring
Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals are required to subject to re-transfer prohibitions only those transfers intended for non-states parties.
C. Summary
In sum, Section IV has shown that the CWC contains a number of
transfer rules that require states parties to prohibit,restrictor declare the
transfer or export of materials subject to the CWC's material scope. Depending on the materials concerned, three categories of transfer rules can
be distinguished. Article 1.1(a) comprises the first category, applicable
only to chemical weapons as defined in Article 11.1. Article 1.1(d) incorporates the second category of transfer rules. These rules are applicable
not only to materials representing chemical weapons, but also to materials with a mere potential to be used for chemical weapon purposes

106. CWC, supra note 2, art. 11.9, 32 I.L.M. at 805-06.
107. CWC, supra note 2, Annex on Chemicals pt. A.l(c), 32 I.L.M. at 821-22.

108. For further discussion, see Zedalis, supra note 10, at 155-62.
109. See CWC, supra note 2, VA pt. VI.A.1, 32 I.L.M. at 853-54 (in connection with
VA pt. VI.B.4.).
110. See CWC, supra note 2, VA pts. VII.C.32, VUI.C.26, 32 I.L.M. at 859, 862.

MichiganJournalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:393

(therefore including any chemicals, munitions, devices, or equipment,
and any materials, manufacturing equipment, financial resources and
intangible goods suitable for chemical weapon purposes). Finally, Article VI and the corresponding parts of the VA embody the third category
of transfer rules, applicable only to TCPs.

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF

CWC

TRANSFER RULES

With the goods falling under the CWC's material scope and the rules
governing their transfer now identified, it remains to be clarified whether
and by what means these rules need to be implemented on the national
level. This section examines these two questions. The question regarding
national implementation is addressed in sub-section (A). Sub-sections
(B) and (C), which deal with possible means of national implementation,
focus on export controls and sanctions, respectively.
A. NationalImplementation
The addressees of the transfer rules are the states parties of the
CWC. In fact, Articles 1.1 and VI, as well as the relevant parts of the
VA, are exclusively directed at "State Parties."' Accordingly, only the
activities of governmental branches or agencies of CWC states parties
are subject to the CWC transfer rules. 1 2 The activities of private entities
(i.e., natural and legal persons) are not covered.
In order to extend the reach of the CWC to activities of private entities, the CWC requires states parties-by means of Articles VII. 1 and
VI.2-to implement all CWC obligations in national law."3
111. See CWC, supra note 2, arts. 1.1, VI, 32 I.L.M. at 804, 853-62.
112. See Zedalis, supra note 10, at 146.
113. On the basis of these implementation obligations, some commentators argue that

the CWC is of a non-self-executing character. See, e.g., KRuTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10,
at 109. This argument is problematic. In fact, the existence in an international treaty of an
obligation to implement the treaty provisions nationally does not exclude that certain provi-

sions of the treaty may be considered self-executing. See, e.g., International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter CCPR]. Although CCPR

art. 2.2 asks signatory states to implement the CCPR provisions nationally, provisions such as
CCPR arts. 6 or 7 keep their self-executing character. Therefore, whether an international
provision is self-executing does not depend on whether the international provision has to be
implemented or not in national law. It depends solely on whether its contents is intended to
create rights (or duties) for individuals, and whether its wording is sufficiently precise to serve
as legal basis for the definition of such rights (or duties). Accordingly, it is not on grounds of
CWC arts. VII. 1 and VI.2 that we can conclude whether the CWC does or not contain selfexecuting provisions. Bothe supports this viewpoint, arguing that CWC art. 1.1 per se is self-

executing, while CWC art. VI.2 (and thus CWC art. VII.1) is "a classical example of a nonself-executing provision." Michael Bothe, NationalImplementation of the CWC: Some Legal
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Accordingly, states parties are required to establish national legislation
implementing the CWC transfer rules. Paragraphs 1 and 2 analyze the
contents of Articles VII.1 and VI.2, respectively, while paragraph 3 assesses the findings of this analysis.
1. Article VII.1
Article VII. 1 states:
Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention. In particular, it shall:
(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as
recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention,
including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;
(b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention; and
(c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited to a State Party under
this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons,
possessing
its nationality, in conformity with international
4
law.'
Article VII. 1 is structured in two parts, namely a chapeau and three
sub-paragraphs. According to its chapeau, Article VII.1 primarily requires a state party to adopt the measures it considers "necessary" for the
implementation of "its obligations" under the CWC."' The phrase "its
obligations" covers not only all CWC transfer rules, but also all other
obligations anchored in the CWC. Therefore, it can be held that Article
VII. 1 represents the "general implementation obligation" of the Convention." 6

Considerations, in

THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION-IMPLEMENTATION

AND

PROSPECTS 543, 544 (Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1998).
114. CWC, supra note 2, art. VII.l, 32 I.L.M. at 810 (emphasis added).
115. CWC, supra note 2, art. VII.1, 32 I.L.M. at 810.
116. The term "general implementation obligation" is borrowed from
TRAPP, supra note 10, at 109.

KRUTZSCH

&
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The three sub-paragraphs concern the implementation of national
law governing prohibited activities. "7 With respect to the CWC transfer
rules, the particular obligations merely apply to those transfer rules that
establish prohibitions. These rules include:
*
Article 1.1(a) and (d) (prohibition of chemical weapon transfers, and of assistance in chemical weapon activities);
*
Part VI VA, A.1, A.2 and B.4 (prohibitions applying to
(re)transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals);
"
Part VII VA, C. 31 (prohibition of transfers to non-states
parties of Schedule 2 chemicals);
*
Part VII VA, C.32(b) (prohibition for non-states parties to
re-transfer Schedule 2 chemicals); and
*
Part VIII VA, C.26(b) (prohibition for non-states parties to
re-transfer Schedule 3 chemicals).
As is expressed by the words "in particular," the obligations listed in
the sub-paragraphs represent a minimum standard. " ' In principle, a state
party is free to implement a higher standard, provided that three conditions are fulfilled." 9 First, any additional measures must appear
necessary. 2 ° Second, they must be in conformity with international
22
law.12' Third, they ought not to conflict with other CWC provisions
According to the minimum standard established in the three Subparagraphs of Article VII. 1, a state party is obliged
(a)

to enact penal legislation forbidding all natural and legal
persons anywhere on its territory or under its jurisdiction to
undertake prohibited activities;

(b)

to implement (penal) legislation forbidding natural and legal
persons of its own or a foreign nationality to undertake prohibited activities in any place under its defacto control; and

117. See emphasis in the text of the provision, supra note 114; see also Ronzitti, supra
note 10, at 913.
118. Cf. Marauhn, supra note 10, at 493.
119. Marauhn mentions as a further condition the subjection of additional measures to
the territoriality principle. Id., supra note 10, at 494. However, the Convention does not establish such a requirement.
120. See CWC, supra note 2, arts. VI.2, VII.., 32 I.L.M. at 810.
121. See CWC, supra note 2, arts. VII.l(a), (c), 32 I.L.M. at 810.
122. National implementation measures primarily risk conflicting with CWC art. XI.1.
Regarding the contents of this provision, see infra Part V.B.2.b.
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to extend its penal legislation enacted under (a) to all natural
persons abroad who carry its nationality.'3

As follows from this analysis, a state party has to provide at least for
penal legislation when implementing the CWC transfer rules pertaining
to prohibitions. The precise contents of the obligation to enact penal
legislation is discussed in sub-section (C), which deals specifically with
the question of sanctions.
2. Article VI.2
Article VI.2 reads:
Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure
that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only ... transferred
...within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction
or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. To
this end, . . . each State Party shall subject toxic chemicals and
their precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex on
Chemicals ...to verification measures as provided in the Verification Annex. 24
As is indicated by the phrase "shall adopt the necessary measures to
ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only ... transferred
..
for purposes not prohibited," Article VI.2 specifically addresses the
implementation into national law of the CWC transfer rules concerning
TCPs. The clause can thus be qualified as the CWC's "specific implementation provision.""'
Unlike Article VII.1, Article VI.2 does not establish particular implementation obligations. It simply reaffirms that states parties have to
the transfer rules concerning TCPs in accordance with the
implement
6

VA.1

3. Assessment
As shown, the CWC contains two clauses, Articles VII.1 and VI.2,
that require states parties to implement the transfer rules and all other
CWC obligations into national legislation. Regarding their core contents,
the two provisions are identical in that they ask states parties to adopt the
measures necessary to fulfill all CWC obligations. The main difference
123. For a discussion in more detail, see infra Part V.C.
124. CWC, supra note 2, art. VI.2, 32 I.L.M. at 810.
125. This term is again borrowed from KRuTZSCH & TR"AP, supra note 10, at 109 n. 3.

126. See CWC, supra note 2, art. VI.2, 32 I.L.M. at 810.
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lies in the fact that Article VII. 1 establishes a minimum standard concerning the implementation into national law of those transfer rules
pertaining to prohibitions. This standard 2concerns
the enactment of penal
7
sanctions and is discussed further below.
It is self-evident that the implementation into national law of the transfer rules pertaining to TCPs needs to occur in accordance with the
requirements listed in the VA. Article VI.2, which establishes this obvious
directive, can therefore be regarded as legally redundant. The clause
merely helps to clarify that the CWC provisions concerning TCP transfer
prohibitions must be implemented into national law in accordance with
both the minimum standard of Article VII. 1(a)-(c) and the requirements of
the VA.
B. Export Controls
The previous discussion has shown that Articles VI.2 and VII. 1 deal
with the national implementation of the CWC obligations in general and
the CWC transfer rules in particular. The question now is whether the
two provisions require states parties to control the export of materials
falling under the CWC's material scope.
Surprisingly, neither Article VI.2 nor VII.1 explicitly establish an
export control obligation. This has induced some commentators to observe that the decision about how to implement the CWC is entirely left
to the states parties. 28 This conclusion is only partially correct. Although
Articles VI.2 and VII.1 grant states parties considerable leeway in
choosing appropriate national implementation measures, they nevertheless require the enactment of precisely those measures that are
"necessary" to fulfill the CWC's obligations.
Krutzsch/Trapp confirm that the freedom of states parties in the
realm of national implementation is not absolute. They observe:
While the specifics of the measures required are at the discretion
of the State Party, the words 'necessary measures' indicate that a
State Party will have lived up to this obligation only, when its
national measures ensure the implementation of the rather broad
and complex field of diverse obligations contained in all parts of
the Convention .... 129
127. See infra Part V.C.

128. See, e.g., Stock & De Geer, supra note 10, at 1; Kurzidem et al., The National
Authority: Some Important Issues to Be Addressed, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION PAPER No. 10, at 15 (last modified Sept. 16, 1997) <http://www.sipri.se/
cbw/research/ssf-cwc-paperl0.html> (conclusions).
129. KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 109.
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Correspondingly, it remains to be seen what national measures are
"necessary" for the implementation of the CWC transfer rules.
The CWC does not define the term "necessary measures." The only
indication as to the contents of the notion can be found in Subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Article VII.1, which require states parties to
enact specific penal legislation. Thus, the question arises of whether the
CWC requires the enactment of penal legislation as the sole national implementation measure.
Obviously, this is not the case. The enactment of penal legislation
alone would represent a measure inadequate to fulfill the CWC transfer
rules for two reasons. First, the transfer rules-reflecting the central
nonproliferation obligation of the CWC-primarily aim at the prevention of chemical weapon activities. Penal law, on the other hand,
develops its main legal impact only ex post, that is, when prevention no
longer is possible. Second, certain CWC transfer rules ask states parties
to collect aggregate national data on transfers and exports of scheduled
chemicals. It is impossible to imagine how this requirement can be fulfilled on the mere basis of penal law. On the other hand, there is little
doubt that administrative export control law represents a type of law
quite appropriate both for the effective prevention of possible violations
of CWC transfer rules as well as the collection of national data.
Accordingly, the CWC-if not explicitly, at least implicitly by
means of the term "necessary measures"-requires states parties to enact
administrative export control law.' As a consequence, national export
controls are "integral" to the implementation of the CWC transfer
"
' The enactment of penal law, on the other hand, must be underrules. 32
stood as a measure reinforcing national export controls. It, in itself,
would represent an insufficient means to fulfill the CWC transfer rules.
1. Scope
In general, commentators have recognized the implicit export control requirement anchored in Articles VI.2 and VII.1. However, they
have done so only in regard to the transfer rules applying to TCPs. For
instance, concerning the transfer prohibitions applicable to Schedule 1
chemicals, Krutzsch/Trapp observe that "[t]he requirement not to transfer such chemicals ... will require a tight national control of all export
130. Cf.Marauhn, supra note 10, at 494 (indicating that the obligations of Article VII

may make it necessary that the states enact administrative measures).
131. The enacting of national export control law, it is commonly argued, is required by
the effet utile rule according to which a treaty must be interpreted in a way that gives it practical relevance. See, e.g., Bothe, supra note 10, at 549.
132. See SMITHSON, supra note 10, at 26.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:393

activities of such chemicals ...
Similarly, Zedalis asserts that "no
doubt exists that the CWC provides for controls over exports of toxic
chemicals and their precursors ... 134Regarding the other goods that
may qualify as chemical weapons (i.e., munitions, devices, and equipment), no reference to an implicit export control obligation could be
found in the scholarly literature.
This lack of reference, however, cannot mean that the CWC's implicit export control requirement does not apply to munitions, devices, or
equipment. As previously shown, Article VII.1 asks states parties to take
the necessary measures to implement into national law the prohibition of
chemical weapon transfers anchored in Article 1.
1(a). Given the fact that
various materials (i.e., TCPs, munitions, devices, and equipment) may
under specific circumstances qualify as chemical weapons, a proper implementation of Article I.1(a) requires each state party to control the
export not only of TCPs, but also of munitions, devices, and equipment.
In other words, if Article 1.
1(a) requires-as Zedalis and Pathe correctly
35
observe' -export controls for all TCPs (including the tens of thousands
of unscheduled chemicals) due to the fact that all TCPs have a possible
application as chemical weapons, it also and a fortiori requires export
controls for all munitions, devices, and equipment. As much as states
parties can ensure only through national export controls that TCPs are
not used for chemical weapon purposes, only national export controls
allow them to guarantee that munitions, devices and equipment have not
been specifically designed for prohibited purposes.
Accordingly, two conclusions may be drawn. First, the implicit export control obligation in the CWC applies not only to TCPs, but also to
munitions, devices, and equipment. Second, on the basis of Article 1.
1(d)
in connection with Article VII. 1, it is equally applicable in the realm of
activities that may qualify as assistance to prohibited activities. Therefore, a state party to the CWC must provide for national export control
legislation covering any type of dual-use material, financial resource, or
36
intangible good that might be transferred for chemical weapon purposes.
133. KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 417 (emphasis added).
134. Zedalis, supra note 10, at 148 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 152; Helmut Pathe, Kriegswaffenkontrollrecht,in HANDBUCH DES AUSSEN-

745, 944 (Klaus Bieneck ed., 1998).
136. Traditionally, states were able to implement international export control obligations
by means of export control lists. However, the material scope of the CWC is too vast to apply
the listing technique alone. While the listing technique is adequate to deal with the scheduled
chemicals, it is only by means of a catch-all clause that a state party is able to subject to its
national export control legislation all the unscheduled chemicals as well as all the dual-use
materials, financial resources and immaterial goods apt to serve chemical weapon purposes.
WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT

Accordingly, it can be concluded that CWC art. VII.1 requires states parties to establish a

catch-allclause. See CWC, supra note 2, arts. 1.1(d), VII.l, 32 I.L.M. at 804, 810. Regarding
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2. Limits

The previous discussion has shown that the CWC implicitly requires
the establishment of national export controls for all goods falling under its
material scope. This section focuses on the limits applicable to such national export control measures. More precisely, it examines whether and to
what extent the CWC sets a minimum and a maximum implementation
limit.
a. Minimum Implementation Limit
As shown above, Articles VI.2 and VII.1 require states parties to
establish the national export control measures necessary to fulfill the
CWC transfer rules. In so doing, the provisions set a minimum implementation limit. In fact, they oblige each state party to set up exactly that
minimum level of national export control measures that is necessary to
fulfill the transfer rules. This finding allows for two closely connected
conclusions. First, one should note that for each state party, the minimum
implementation limit always coincides with the level of export control
measures it necessarily has to establish in order to fulfill the CWC transfer
rules. Second, it needs to be stressed that states parties are therefore not
allowed to go below the minimum implementation limit in their national
implementation of the CWC transfer rules (see below, Figure 2).
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the impact of this catch-all clause requirement on possible national implementation disparities,
see infra Part V.B.2.a.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:393

These conclusions, in turn, give rise to the question of whether the
minimum implementation limit may vary from state party to state party,
depending, for instance, on the level of economic development of the
respective domestic chemical industries.
Theoretically, the absence in the CWC of a clearly formulated, universal export control obligation allows for national disparities in the
realm of export control legislation. In practice, however, disparities may
emerge only with regard to law enforcement. In the realm of export
control legislation, national disparities are technically impossible, given
the fact that the CWC transfer rules can be implemented correctly only
by means of a catch-all clause that covers all goods apt to serve chemical weapon purposes.'37 Such a clause by definition rules out national
disparities in export control legislation.
National disparities in law enforcement are possible, but should be
avoided. The effective implementation of nonproliferation requires that
national disparities in this area be minimal. Only with the highest degree of international harmonization can the circumvention of export
prohibitions be prevented and chemical nonproliferation most effectively
attained.
b. Maximum Implementation Limit
The Convention contains two provisions, Articles XI. 1 and VI. 11,
that implicitly set a maximum implementation limit to national export
control measures. Given the fact that the two provisions are nearly identical in their wording, the following analysis only bears on Article
XI. 1.138

Article XI. 1 states:
"The provisions of this Convention shall be implemented in a
manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of States Parties, and international cooperation
in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited
under this Convention ....

137. See supra note 136.
138. In light of'CWC Article XI. 1, Krutzsch & Trapp agree that Article VI. 11 can be
considered legally redundant. KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 106.

139. The provision gives an example of activities that may be considered legitimate international cooperation. Such activities may include "the international exchange of scientific
and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use
of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention." CWC, supra note 2, art.
XI.I, 32 I.L.M. at 818.
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This requires states parties to implement the CWC (and, more particularly, its transfer rules) in a way that would not hamper the economic
and technological development of other states parties. 40 In doing so, Article XI.1 grants each state party a right to economic development.

Simultaneously, it prohibits any transfer restriction that would infringe
on this right. Article XI.1 thus sets a maximum implementation limit,

requiring states parties to refrain-though only in their commercial relations to other states parties-from national export control measures that
would go beyond what is necessary to fulfill the Convention's transfer
rules (see infra, Figure 3).141
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Article XI.1 refrains from determining the maximum implementation in precise terms. More concrete guidelines regarding the scope of
the maximum implementation limit can however be found in Article

140. A number of developing countries during the negotiations proposed to change the
provision's wording from "shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering..." to
"shall not hamper .... " Working Paper on art. 11, Economic and Technological Development, Conference on Disarmament, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, U.N. Doc.

CD/CW/WP.409 (1992), at 2 (Working paper submitted by Algeria, China, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Burma, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zaire). Although it is regrettable that the shorter and more precise wording was not adopted, it is safe to say that the
meaning of the current version does not differ from that of the rejected one.
141. For a detailed discussion of CWC art. XI, see Natalino Ronzitti, Economic and
Technological Development and Trade in Chemicals, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION-IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS

533-42 (M. Bothe et al. eds., 1998).
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XI.2, which defines
the right to economic development in negative and
42
positive terms.1
The introductory sentence of Article XI.2 contains a negative definition of the right to economic development. Accordingly, the right to
economic development is not absolute, but always "subject to the provisions of this Convention and without prejudice to the principles and
applicable rules of international law.' ' 43 This, in turn, means that transfer
restrictions established in accordance with the minimum implementation
limit set in Articles VI.2 and VII.1, on the one hand, and international
law,M on45 the other, prevail at any time over the right to economic development.
Sub-paragraphs (b)-(e) of Article XI.2 define the right to economic
development in positive terms. According to these provisions, this right
requires states parties:
"
to facilitate "the fullest possible exchange of chemicals,
equipment and scientific and technical information relating
to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this Convention;"'
*

not to maintain "among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements, incompatible with
the obligations undertaken under this Convention, which
would restrict or impede trade and the development and
promotion of scientific and technological knowledge
in the
47
purposes;'
peaceful
for..,
field of chemistry

*

not to establish or maintain "any measures other than those
provided for, or permitted, under this Convention;"'' 48 and

142. CWC, supra note 2, art. XI.2, 32 I.L.M. at 818-19.
143. Id.; see also Ronzitti, supra note 141, at 536.

144. Permitted transfer restrictions under international law include, e.g., restrictions established under art. XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. This provision allows WTO parties to establish trade restrictions in case of war or grave international tension or in order to protect essential security
interests. Furthermore, customary ius in bello may permit states parties to the CWC to establish or maintain trade restrictions notwithstanding CWC art. XI.I. Finally, prevailing

international restrictions may be grounded in resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. See
Ronzitti, supra note 141, at 537.

145. Accordingly, a state party is permitted to implement the transfer control measures
necessary to fulfill the CWC. This may imply the establishment of measures going beyond the
minimum requirements listed in CWC Articles VII.1(a) to (c). CWC, supra note 2, art.

VH.l(a)-(c), 32 I.L.M. at 810. In this context, it is, however, important to note that the maintenance or establishment of such measures may conflict with CWC art. XI. 1. See infra.
146. CWC, supra note 2, art. XI.2(b), 32 I.L.M. at 819.

147. CWC, supra note 2, art. XI.2(c), 32 I.L.M. at 819.
148. CWC, supra note 2, art. XI.2(d), 32 I.L.M. at 819.
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not to "use any other international agreement for pursuing
an objective inconsistent with this Convention; ' 49
to review existing national export control measures "in the
field of trade in chemicals in order to render them
consistent
50
1
with the object and purpose of this Convention.'
The four duties can be divided into two groups. Sub-paragraphs (c)
and (d) require states parties to neither establish nor maintain among
themselves any export restrictions-be they of unilateral or multilateral
nature-that are inconsistent with the provisions and purposes of the
CWC. 5' By prohibiting states parties to go beyond the level of restrictions necessary to fulfill the CWC transfer rules, the two Sub-paragraphs
thus cause the maximum implementation limit to coincide with the
minimum implementation limit (see Figure 4).
Sub-paragraphs (b) and (e), on the other hand, require states parties
to review their national export control measures and to eliminate all restrictions infringing on the right to economic development. Therefore,
they too prohibit any national export control measures that would go
beyond what is necessary to fulfill the CWC transfer rules. As a consequence, they again let the maximum and minimum implementation
limits coincide at the level of the measures necessary to fulfill the CWC
transfer rules.

149. CWC, supra note 2, art. XI.2(d), 32 I.L.M. at 819.

150. CWC, supra note 2, art. XI.2(e), 32 I.L.M. at 819.
151. These two provisions thus are of particular importance in regard to the question of
whether or not the AG needs to be dismantled. Some commentators argue that the CWC does
not require the abolishment of the AG. See, e.g., Marauhn, supra note 10, at 497. Others say
that the question is difficult to answer. See, e.g., Ronzitti, supra note 141, at 539. These observations are correct only insofar as the CWC does not contain an explicit obligation
pertaining to the dissolution of the AG. However, by asking states parties not to use any other
international agreement in the realm of chemical nonproliferation "for pursuing an objective
inconsistent with the CWC," CWC art. XI.2(d) implicitly asks for the dismantling of the AG.
CWC, supra note 2, art. XI.2(d), 32 I.L.M. at 819. Indeed, due to the fact that the AG, contrary to the CWC, pursues the objective of selective rather than universal nonproliferation, it
is inconsistent with the latter and must therefore-in accordance with CWC art. XI.2(d)-be
abolished.
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3. Assessment
The CWC does not contain an explicit obligation to establish national export controls. Articles VI.2 and VII.1 simply require states
parties to adopt the "necessary measures" to implement the CWC transfer rules. The text of the Convention leaves open the question of whether
states parties have to set up national export controls. It only clarifies-by
means of Sub-paragraphs (a)-(c) of Article VII.1-that the notion
"necessary measures" requires the enactment of specific penal legislation.
That the enactment of penal law alone is insufficient to guarantee the
effective implementation of the CWC transfer rules is obvious. Penal
law is suited neither for ex ante controls of exports nor for the collection
of national data. If a state party wants to fulfill these requirements, it has
to enact administrative export control law. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the term "necessary measures" implicitly requires states
parties to establish national export controls.
National export controls must cover the entire material scope of the
CWC. Accordingly, states parties are obliged to provide for national ex-
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port control legislation covering not only the scheduled chemicals, but
also any unscheduled chemical, as well as any type of dual-use material,
financial resource, or intangible good that might be transferred for
chemical weapon purposes. While the scheduled chemicals may be subject to national legislation by means of a control list, the latter group of
goods can be covered only with a catch-all clause. The term "necessary
measures" thus requires states parties to enact not only export control
lists, but also a catch-all clause. Due to this requirement, national disparities in the realm of export control legislation are ruled out. As far as
they occur in the realm of law enforcement, they should be eliminated,
since only on the basis of harmonized national export control legislation
can chemical nonproliferation be attained most effectively.
Although the CWC does not contain an explicit reference to national
export control measures, it establishes certain limits applicable to the
implementation of such measures. The minimum implementation limit is
set by the term "necessary measures" itself. According to this requirement, a state party is not allowed to go below the measures that are
necessary to fulfill the CWC transfer rules. The maximum implementation limit, on the other hand, is defined in Articles XI. 1 and VI. 11. These
provisions establish an actual right to economic development, which
requires states parties-though only in their commercial relations with
other states parties-to refrain from national export control measures
that would go beyond what is necessary to fulfill the CWC transfer rules.
Given the fact that both implementation limits have "necessary measures" as their point of reference, it can be concluded that they coincide.
C. Sanctions
As previously indicated, Sub-paragraphs (a)-(c) of Article VII. 1 establish three specific requirements applicable to the implementation into
national law of those CWC transfer rules that represent prohibitions.152
The three requirements translate into specific implementation obligations. On the one hand, every state party has to enact penal legislation
covering prohibited activities if undertaken:
by natural and legal persons of any nationality on its own
territory, including territorial and archipelagic waters and
installations on the continental shelf or in the exclusive

152. See supra Part V.A.1.
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economic zone, as well as in any other place under its jurisdiction (e.g., on
vessels under its flag or aircraft registered
15 3
under its law);
*

anywhere else by naturalpersons possessing its nationality."'

On the other hand, every state party has to take appropriatemeasures ensuring that prohibited activities are not undertaken
by natural and legal persons of any nationality in any place
under its defacto control.' 53
Regarding the question of sanctions, the wording of the Subparagraphs prompts the following three observations. First, although
Sub-paragraph (b) does not explicitly refer to penal legislation, it seems
obvious that penal provisions are best suited "not [to] permit" prohibited
activities.' 5' Accordingly, it can be concluded that all three subparagraphs pertain to the enactment of penal legislation.
Second, Sub-paragraph (c) requires states parties to enact penal legislation with extraterritorial effect.'5 7 However, this requirement is
limited to prohibited activities undertaken by naturalpersons.
Third, it has already been pointed out that the obligations anchored
in the three sub-paragraphs represent a mere minimum standard. This is
indicated by the words "in particular" in the chapeau of Article VII.1
and the word "including" in sub-paragraph (a). Therefore, a state party
is, in principle, free to:
enact appropriate administrativemeasures in addition to the
required penal legislation;..
153. CWC, supra note 2, art. VIII.1(a), 32 I.L.M. at 810. See also Marco Gestri, Control
by States Parties over Private ExtraterritorialActivities: Issues of Jurisdiction and International Responsibility, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION-IMPLEMENTATION
AND PROSPECTS 463,470-71 (M. Bothe et al. eds., 1998).
154. CWC, supra note 2, art. VIII.I(c), 32 I.L.M. at 810.
155. CWC, supra note 2, art. VIII.l(b), 32 I.L.M. at 810. Sub-paragraph (b) does not

explicitly define its scope ratione personae. However, the words "any activity" indicates that
all acts of all persons are covered by the provision. Regarding the interpretation of the word

"control", see id. at 471-72.
156. CWC, supra note 2, art. VII.1(b), 32 I.L.M. at 810. The vague formulation of Subparagraph (b), avoiding terms such as "prohibit" or "penal legislation," is due to the fact that
defacto control over a territory strictly speaking does not give the controlling state legislative
authority. Contextually, however, the provision must be interpreted as requiring penal legislation, for the following two reasons. First, only penal measures seem adequate to guarantee

"non-permission" of prohibited activities in territories under de facto control of a foreign
state. Second, the application of penal measures that are not based on legislation is incompatible with the universal principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.

157. For an excellent discussion of the question of extraterritoriality under the CWC, see
Gestri, supra note 153, at 471-72.
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subject other than merely the prohibited activities to penal
legislation;

extend the extraterritorial reach of its penal legislation to the
activities performed abroad by legal persons (i.e., branches
of companies incorporated under national law, or foreign
companies controlled by nationals)."
As already mentioned, three conditions need to be fulfilled in the

case of national implementation measures going beyond the minimum
standard listed in Sub-paragraphs (a)-(c) of Article VII.1. They include
necessity, conformity with international law and conformity with other
CWC provisions.'6

In the absence of any CWC directives, the degree of the respective
sanctions-whether of penal or administrative nature-is left to the discretion of the states parties. As a rule of thumb, the intentional
performance of an activity prohibited under the CWC (including assistance) 6' should always fall under the category "crime." Accordingly,
severe criminal punishment should be its consequence. Equally subject
to criminal punishment should be any negligent behavior leading to an
immediate danger that transferred goods could be used for chemical
weapon purposes. Depending on the gravity of the negligence, such acts
could be defined as either crimes or misdemeanors. Finally, negligence

not endangering the implementation of the central CWC transfer rules

158. In this context, Krutzsch & Trapp observe that "[a]ppropriate means to prohibit
could also be the enacting of prohibitions under administrative law." KRUTZSCH & TRAPP,
supra note 10, at 110.
159. The frequently encountered opinion that the CWC's extraterritorial reach is confined to natural persons thus proves wrong. See, e.g., Zedalis, supra note 10, at 153. Not the
reach itself, but the duty to subject to extraterritorial legislation is limited to natural persons.
The extension of the extraterritorial reach of penal law to activities undertaken abroad by
either foreign companies controlled by nationals, or branches of domestic companies is, insofar as the CWC is concerned, indeed unproblematic. In the former case (as well as in the case
the concerned branch is not incorporated abroad), extraterritorial application of penal law can
be justified on the basis of the generally accepted nationalityprinciple. See also Gestri, supra
note 153, at 473-74. In the latter case, that is, if the concerned branch is incorporated abroad,
the universality principle provides a valid alternative legal basis for extraterritorial penal legislation. According to this principle, a state is entitled to enact rules with extraterritorial effect
in order to further the repression of those criminal acts that are considered harmful to the
fundamental interest and values of the international community. See id. at 469. It cannot seriously be contested that the use, development, etc. of chemical weapons does not represent a
crime under customary international law, especially in light of the fact that its codification in
treaty law has recently been initiated. See Crawford et al., Draft Convention to ProhibitBiological and Chemical Weapons Under Int'l Criminal Law, reprinted in 42 CHEM. & Bio.
WEAPONS CONVENTIONS BULL. 1, 2-5 (Dec. 1998).
160. See supra Part V.A.1.
161. See supra note 85.
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(i.e., false declaration of a transferred chemical) should not be sanctioned under penal law. 62 In such cases, the imposition of administrative
sanctions might be more appropriate.
D. Summary
This section examined whether and by what means the CWC transfer rules need to be implemented in national law. The analysis
concentrated on Articles VII. 1 and VI.2, both of which address issues of
national implementation. Article VI.1 is legally redundant, because its
substance is essentially covered by the CWC's general implementation
obligation, Article VII. 1.
By requiring states parties to enact the necessary measures to fulfill
the CWC transfer rules, Article VII. 1 establishes-though implicitlyan obligation to implement national export control measures that cover
all goods falling under the CWC's material scope. States parties are not
allowed to go below the level of implementation measures necessary for
the successful execution of the transfer rules. Simultaneously, Article
XI.1, which grants a right to economic development, prohibits states
parties to go beyond the level of measures deemed necessary in their
commercial relations with each other.
As shown in Figure 4, the CWC's minimum and maximum implementation limits thus coincide at the level of national implementation
measures that each state party must establish. These measures include,
most importantly:
*

"
"

the establishment of a national export control regime for all
goods that may qualify as chemical weapons according to
Article 11.1;
the adoption of a catch-all clause for all other dual-use
goods apt to serve chemical weapon purposes; and
the enactment of reinforcing penal legislation with partial
extraterritorial reach.

In light of these obligations, it seems wrong to conclude that states
parties have a "wide margin of appreciation" in the domain of national
implementation.1 63 Rather, the CWC requires each state party, regardless
of the situation of its domestic chemical industry, to comply with these
three requirements in order to fulfill the CWC transfer rules.

162. See also KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 10, at 111-12.
163. See Marauhn, supra note 10, at 496.
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The CWC falls short of establishing a fourth requirement, namely
the extension of the reach of domestic penal legislation to illegitimate
activities of legal persons undertaken abroad. Given the open wording of
Article VII. 1, it can be concluded, however, that states parties have the
option to go beyond the minimum standard anchored in Sub-paragraphs
(a)-(c), provided that the criteria of necessity and compatibility with international law and the CWC are fulfilled. Taking into account that the
extension of national penal legislation to illegitimate activities of legal
persons performed abroad appear both necessary and legitimate, it seems
desirable that states parties actively pursue this option.
The degree and type of sanctions applicable to violations of the
transfer rules are not defined in the CWC. It seems appropriate, however, to determine that criminal sanctions should apply to the intentional
violation of CWC transfer rules. Depending on its gravity, negligent behavior leading to an immediate proliferation danger should qualify either
as misdemeanor or felony. Negligent behavior not endangering the central nonproliferation purpose should not be punished under penal law.
Administrative sanctions may be more appropriate in such cases.

CONCLUSION

The present article pursued two goals. First, it attempted to clarify
the export control obligations deriving from the CWC. Second, in so
doing, it intended to provide insight into the question of whether the
CWC represents an adequate legal framework to supplant the AG,
thereby allowing for a move towards greater multilateralism in the realm
of chemical nonproliferation.
Regarding the first goal, the textual analysis has shown that the
CWC refrains from establishing an explicit export control obligation.
However, on the basis of Articles VI.2 and VII.I, in conjunction with
the CWC transfer rules, the CWC implicitly requires states parties to
enact a number of national export control measures. In light of these
manifold export control requirements, the finding that "[t]he convention
does only establish a limited transfer regime"' seems understated. As
supported by the preceding analysis, it is more accurate to conclude that
the CWC provides for an extensive and well-designed legal framework
for national export controls in the realm of chemicals and related dualuse goods.
On the basis of this first conclusion, an answer can be given to the
second question. Taking into account the comprehensive export control
164. Id. at 496.
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regime each state party is required to establish, it appears correct to observe that the legal framework the CWC sets up is well suited to replace
the AG. As one commentator correctly put it: "If states parties agree to
do so, an antiproliferation regime at least as strong and supple as that of
the Australia Group could be developed from the provisions of the
[CWC]",

1 6

The CWC implicitly requires the dissolution of the AG. 16 The replacement of the AG by the CWC would doubtlessly represent a move
towards greater multilateralism. While the AG stresses selectivity in its
approach to nonproliferation, the CWC aims at universality in its approach. In light of the fact that "[tihe goal of widespreadparticipationin
all values throughout the social process is the fundamental criterion of
policy, ' ' greater multilateralism in the realm of nonproliferation is politically desirable. Only on the basis of universal multilateralism can the
goal of nonproliferation be attained most effectively, that is, at the lowest costs for all actors involved.
Although it is both politically desirable and legally required, the
immediate dissolution of the AG would nevertheless be premature.
Given the fact that the AG provides for export control mechanisms not
only in the realm of chemicals, but also in that of biological agents and
related dual-use goods, the CWC alone is unable to substitute for all AG
export controls. Only if the member states of the Conference on Disarmament succeed in creating a protocol to the BTWC that provides for an
export control framework comparable to that of the CWC is there a realistic chance that the AG be dismantled. We may therefore conclude
that the achievement of greater multilateralism in the realm of chemical
nonproliferation is ultimately contingent upon the achievement of
greater multilateralism in the realm of biologicalnonproliferation.

165. Perry Robinson (1995), supra note 10, at 46.
166. See supra note 151.

167. See supra note 1 (emphasis added).

